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Amy Gajda’s The Trials of Academe ought to be required reading for any 
attorney considering or embarking upon a career as a college or university 
counsel. Indeed, those currently serving in such a position should find Gajda’s 
chronicle of the events leading to today’s era of campus litigation absorbing 
as well as graphic proof that they are not the only campus counsel facing a 
growing and increasingly diversified docket of legal disputes.
Gajda, an associate professor at Tulane Law School, persuasively 
distinguishes between the presence of colleges and universities in the courts 
before the 1960s and since, arguing that passage of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 and its progeny during the following decade opened the way for the 
dramatic increase in litigation over the rights of university students, faculty, 
and administrators since then.
Commencing in the 1960s, courts have largely set aside, not always through 
gradual evolution, their traditional doctrines of “academic abstention” and “in 
loco parentis,” doctrines that gave broad and unfettered authority to universities 
to operate largely without judicial interference. This notable change in judicial 
perspective in large part followed the passage of civil rights litigation in the 
1960s and early 1970s. That legislation for the first time delineated explicit 
statutory rights for individuals and groups who were discriminated against 
by public or private entities or by individuals on the basis of race, ethnicity, 
national origin, gender, or other enumerated characteristics.
Gajda reminds the reader on several occasions of Justice Frankfurter’s 
articulation in Sweezy v. New Hampshire1 of the four essential elements of academic 
freedom: “to determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what 
may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study.” 
While recognizing the dramatic increase in judicial involvement in disputes 
arising in the university context, and while recognizing some of the benefits 
that have accrued to all of the relevant parties as a consequence of that increase, 
Gajda retreats time and again to a nostalgic perspective, one that laments 
1. 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
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how “the growing resort to legal process…threatens to undermine values of 
academic freedom that have served American society extremely well” (9–10), 
and how essential it is to “search for ways to…minimize the risks of judicial 
involvement” (19).
Gajda effectively and absorbingly proceeds through her comprehensive 
history of academe and the courts, focusing on the recurring subjects of 
litigation, including anti-discrimination law, First Amendment balancing, 
intellectual property ownership, and faculty/administration tensions. In so 
doing, she seems to evolve in her own views toward a recognition that the 
benefits arising from the dramatic increase in the incidence of litigation must 
be balanced against the detriments attributable to judicial encroachment 
upon the values embedded in notions of academic freedom. She states that 
“[t]he challenge…is to import legal doctrines in a way that is sensitive to 
the academic context and cognizant of its potential costs” (131). Even more 
forcefully, Gajda notes that “[t]he challenge is to shun the alternative extremes 
of wholesale immunity and unbridled oversight and to define terms for court 
intervention that balance interests in nondiscrimination against legitimate 
interests in academic freedom and autonomy (80)…. [W]e are realistically 
left with the unavoidable task of setting a balance point between the value of 
accountability through the courts and the value of limiting intrusions on the 
autonomy of academic communities”(248).
When Gajda’s theses are dissected with vigor, one may be inexorably 
drawn to two fundamental conclusions: first, that she demonstrates a degree 
of concern for academic freedom that appears to downplay the positive 
influences in the academic environment that have been notable in the reported 
case law over the last fifty years; and second, that she directs her entreaties 
to the courts alone for appropriate recognition of the benefits of “academic 
abstention” and the need to recognize the valuable role that academic freedom 
plays in American society.
The world of academe before the tumultuous decade that roughly began with 
passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 can be characterized, with considerable 
and persuasive evidentiary support, as a bastion of white male supremacy. 
With the introduction and growth of legislation and resulting case law that was 
directed at breaking down barriers that thwarted the legitimate aspirations of 
those who theretofore were unwelcome, academic life has admittedly become 
more complex and litigious but also more open and equitable. What Gajda 
views throughout her work as a threat to academic freedom and the academic 
mission can also be viewed as an effort to assure fairness and compliance with 
legal norms that govern all other facets of society’s activities and relationships. 
Put yet another way, have not the efforts of some to preserve academic freedom 
and autonomy come at too great a cost? Is “academic freedom” often nothing 
more than a rubric for preserving the white male dominance of the historical 
academy? In short, have not the rights vested in racial and ethnic minorities 
and in women, by way of example, brought benefits to academia and the larger 
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society that far outweigh whatever disadvantages may be identified as a result 
of judicial intrusion into the unique aspects of academic life and relationships?
Embracing judicial expansion of the rights of all members of the academic 
community does not suggest that courts should disregard the values embedded 
in academic abstention and academic freedom, but by recognizing such values 
courts should not judge colleges and universities differently with respect to 
civil rights from other institutions, public and private. When a member of 
the academic community, for example, asserts unlawful discrimination in 
hiring, promotion, and tenure; encroachment on his or her First Amendment 
or privacy rights; misappropriation of his or her intellectual property; or an 
administrative process that ignores material provisions of the Faculty Code 
of Conduct, Student Code of Conduct, or staff personnel policies, historical 
judicial notions of academic abstention and academic freedom need not and 
should not prevail. Yes, academic life may become less collegial with the 
increasing incidence of campus-related litigation, and yes, life for campus 
senior administrators and their counsel may become more complex and 
law-driven, but this arguably is a small price to pay to enable those who feel 
aggrieved to pursue their claims within the processes prescribed by relevant 
campus policies and regulations and, if deemed necessary, thereafter through 
the courts. In the last two decades or more, campus counsel have become 
accustomed to confronting such disputes, to helping the parties frame 
the legal issues, to helping to resolve disputes before they escalate, and to 
providing advice and counsel to senior administrators that often leads to a 
softening of once-intractable positions and early resolution. Even in the most 
contentious of contexts, university lawyers have assisted judicial and external 
administrative proceedings to the end that the courts are more likely to reach 
a just conclusion regarding the respective rights and obligations of the parties.
Gajda makes a persuasive case that universities should do a better job 
of educating the judicial decision maker about what is and is not unique 
about the academic environment. She states that “[t]he biggest priority for 
universities, today and going forward, must be to work to educate courts 
about the importance and social value of higher education to society, and the 
importance of academic freedom and institutional autonomy to the success 
of higher education” (252). No one can legitimately argue with Gajda’s 
proposition, provided the education effort does not downplay the admirable 
improvements in the openness and equality on campuses that have been 
achieved over the last five-plus decades. At the same time, Gajda’s laudable 
proposition is too narrowly framed. Despite zealous efforts to educate the 
courts about the uniqueness of American institutions of higher education, 
individual judges and justices have and will continue to harbor different views 
about the extent to which courts should defer to academic judgments and 
behaviors. As Gajda points out, some, such as Justice Stephen Breyer in Wynne 
v. Tufts University School of Medicine2 (a case in which the court refused to second 
guess the medical school’s decision to dismiss a failing student who claimed he 
2. 976 F.2d 791 (1992).
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needed relief from multiple-choice exams due to his dyslexia), will defer to the 
subjective judgment and experience of the professoriate, an attitude perhaps 
attributable in Justice Breyer’s case to his having spent more than a quarter of 
a century as a member of the faculty of the Harvard Law School. Yet others, 
such as Justice Clarence Thomas in Grutter v. Bollinger3 (the case addressing the 
permissibility of employing affirmative action in the context of admissions 
to the University of Michigan Law School) mock the alleged superiority of 
higher education decision making and find no rationale for treating colleges 
and universities differently in the courtroom from any other institution.
With these judicial realities in mind, one might constructively advance 
Gajda’s thesis by expanding its intended audience to include legislators and 
the public they serve. In today’s increasingly polarized and strident political 
environment, it is not so much the courts that need to understand the critical 
roles played by today’s university, but rather those who choose their elected 
representatives and the representatives who, once elected, develop and put 
into effect the laws, policies, and budgets that dramatically impact higher 
education. When state legislatures and governors make budgetary decisions, 
particularly in today’s fiscally trying times, they must be aware of the costs, 
present and future, associated with dramatic reductions in higher education 
funding. Similarly, they must be provided with the relevant data and 
arguments to surmount the temptation to succumb to the entreaties of vocal 
but misguided constituents to hold budgetary allocations hostage to efforts 
to encroach upon the university’s right to decide without outside interference 
who teaches, what is taught, how it is taught, and to whom.
3. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
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